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Reflection  paper. of Professor  Immenga
Sutstantive nurcs of m
I.  tntroductory Remarks: hnciptes
It might be considered as too ambitious or even adventurous to develop zubstantive  nrles
which are designed to govern conflicts in international compdition.  The globalization of
economies,  however, increasingly  raises the question of an international'code  as a basis to
overcome rising controversies  between governments and betneen firms with regard to aspects
of competition.
To start a discussion  it seems to be advisable  not to develop rules of a code but to present a
non-exhaustive list of principal issues and options. This list should start with some
observations with regard to principles, which might determine the formulation of rules.
First principle: The preservation of market eccess
As a consequence of the Uruguay Round achievements  and the reduction of governmental
restrictions of trade there will be a considerable increase of free movement of goods and
services. In contrast  to $e EC framework, however, the newly develo@ GATT rules do not
regulate  private anticompetitive behaviour. This is a disregard of firms' possibilities to restrict
cross-border market access. Consequently,  there have to be instnrments  against private actions
complementary  to the GATT rules which might replace governmental  barriers by private
ones.
Second principle: Devclopment of nrles as close as possible to cxisting GATT rules-
To preserve a consistency of rules and institutions and to promote political acceptance the
WTO system should be extended  along the lines of the present system in order to develop
international  competition rules as a plurilateral agreement.  (Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement)
Third principle: Harmonization of competition and trade rules.
There is a rising consensus of the interrelation of competition and trade iszues. The respective
rules have to be develo@ in consistency. It should be studied, to which extent trade rules
(e.g. antidumping) could be substituted  by competitio.n  rules.
Fourth principle: Introduction of basic nrlcs which are internationdly acccpted.
Already at the present stage of developments  in competition  policy it seems to be possible to
achievi a general consensus on lower levels: a ban on clear anticompetitive  behaviour as price
cartels or a misuse confol of dominant  firms.4
Fifth principle: Basics of implementation
A cautious approach requires the implementation of international  nrles as part of national law,
which are minimum ntles and applicable to international  activities only.
Sixth principle: Carefrrl enlargement of cxisting institutions of international trade-
It seems. necessilry to establish an international forum for consultations  and inftrmation
exchanges which,'frrthermore, might act as an addressee  of notifications.
Seventh principle: Development of nrles egeinst governmental business behaviour-
Governments might act like private firms. They own corporations  and grant-monopolies  in
certain branches of the economy. Furthermorl,  state instiUrtions might influence private
business actions. Rules against private business actions should be applicable in case of
government actions as well.
Eighth principle: Development of nrle-oriented  competition and trrde policies-
Competition  issues to a large extent and even more trade issues are influenceil  by politics. To
achieve a more stable framework for international  trade the influence of potitics should be
gradually reduced  and replaced by general applicable rules-
Horizontal Agreements
Hard core cartels
Issues:
This form of horizontal  agreements concerns price fixing, ou@ut reSlraints, market division,
customer allocation, colluiive tendering, These kinds of behaviour are opposed to competition
and - as for instance market divisions - impede cross-border market access. It mig[t be
discussed,  if this list should be extended (e.g. according to UNCTAD  CODE Sect.D)'
Options:
- Prohibition
- Misuse control
- Exemptions  (de minimis rules or for export cartels)
An absolute ban with regard to the above mentioned  forms of cartels seems to be appropriate.
It would be based on a general  consensus. The prohibition  should include export and import
cartels. Both are directly opposed to trade objectives. They should be perni$ed only, if they
are necessary to enter fbreign markets. A ban on export cartels would be in line with recent
GATT rules on voluntary  export restraints (VER; Art.XIX GATT as a result of the-agreement
on safeguards). De minimii rules might be envisaged with regard to a local character of
cartels or to quantitative  limitations.
il.
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2.  Other anticompetitive  agreements (horizontal cooperation)
Issues:
Competition  policy has to distinguish  benpeen "naked" cartels and those agreements,  which
by their nature imply positive effects. An often cited example is R & D cooperation-
Agreements of this-kind might improve rationalization or even increase competition in the
field of parameters  which are trot concerned  by the cooperation.
Options:
- ixclusion from competition nrles during a first stage when develo'ping an international code
- Individual  exemptions
- Group exemptions
- Introduction of a rule of reason
- General misuse control
Cooperation agreements should not generally be excluded from competion  rules. They might
ptod'u.. severJanticompetitive  effects or even disguise "naked" cartels. Individual  exemptions
as provided by the EC-law are impossible, as long as there is no zupranational authority.
Group e*".piions or a.legalizationof  certain kinds,of agreements as for instance.according
to tha Germin law seem to te Oimcult to achieve on an intcrnational  level. A general misuse
control does not provide sufficient predictable criteria. Therefore, the intoduction of a rule
of reason similar to the US-law seems to be preferable. Quantitative thresholds might be
envisaged. The rule of reason should refer expressly to three points:
. - Balance  against procompetitive  effects
- Balance  against efficiencies
- Cooperation as a condition to enter a new market (e.g. joint purchasing)
nl. Vertical Restraints (Distrihution  Strategies)
Issues:
Distribution strategies  include contractual  and economic ties such as vertical price ftxing,
exclusive ilrangements,  and the inducement  by economic pressure or influence upon a
supplier to behave anticompetitively. Thereby vertical restraints may harm competition  and
res8ict cross-border trade.
National competition policies and international code of conduct generally contain a strict
prohibition  of resale price fxing. Beyond this common understanding  policies with regard to
vertical restraints are controversial  because of their contradictory effects. They may be anti-
or procompetitive. The evaluation depends on various factors:
- Balance of intra- and interbrand competition
- The market stnrcunre, in particular dominance of one of the acting or contracting firms
- Extent of vertically practised systems
- Anti- and procompetitive  effects may vary in different countries
Options:
- Besides  resale price maintenance no general prohibition because of the uncertain competitive
effects of vertical restraints.6
- Dealing with vertical restraints in relation with dominance only. This approach would reflect
the relevance of the market structure  and an often prevailing intention of monopolizing. Wide
spread parallel contractual systems,  however, are disregarded.
-'Specific exemptions  might-be  considered according to products (e.g. automobiles), services
(e.g. pubs), ot disriUutidn syrt ^ 
(e.g. franchising;. fnis is one of the legal instruments of
tfre gb-Uaw when it deals with vertical restraints. But it does not seem to be an appropriate
approach  in a worldwide system. Detailed provisions  would be necessary and the difficulties
to achieve an overall agreement will be insurmountable.
- The Draft International Antitrust Code @y the Munich Group)t proposes a misuse control
with complementary presumptions. This kind of control provides a flexible response while
presumptions may grant at least a certain degree of legal security-
IV. Abuse of Intellectual  Property Rights
Iszues:
- Industrial property right laws grant le!'at monopolies or at least monopoly-like pxlsitions.
This impliei an unauoiOaUle conflict with competition laws. One of the objectives of
.competition  laws is the delimination  of the legal scorpe of.indusrial  property rigbt laws: What
is inherent in the gnnted monopoly? Potentiat conflicS arise with licensing  practices.
- The legal monopolies provided by indusrial property right laws may be exrcnded by
exclusionary practiies  (licensing con&cts might include non-competition  or non-contestation
clauses). ftrese practices will cause harrr to competition  similar to the effects of vertical
restrainis. Furthermore,  these practices  might be used to create or strengthen  market power.
.Options:
- Conflics between indusfial property rigbtlaws  and antitrust laws as well as abuses might
be prevented by detailed, though not exhaustive lists of clauses which are regarded to be
inherent in the legal monopolies or acceptable  under standards of a rule of reason, This is
basically  the approach of the Draft International Antitrust Code and the German law'
- Anticompetitive  effects of the exercise of intellecoal property righ6 might be qualified
trnder general rules for horizontal and vertical agreemens.  Exemptions might be granted
individually or by group exemption.  The EC-kw has been developed on these lines.
- The US-law similarly applies. its general rules of flsmineogg,  horizontal and vertical
agfeements. Restrictions which are deemed to be anticompetitive but justified wittt regard to
the intentions of industrial property right laws might be qualified as reasonable.
The last approach is in accordance  with the TRIPS agreement which deals expressly with
abuses of intellectual  property rights (Art.4O) under the heading of "Control of Anticompe-
titive Practices  in Conffictual  Licences".  The obligations  imposed on the contracting parties
are not far-reaching. In general, however, they are deterrrining the rationale of a general
applicable solution. It might be discussed, whether specific rules beyond TRIPS will be
necessary. An institutional  extension of the WTO, however, has to comprise the enforcement
' published in Fikentscher/lmmenga,  Draft International Antitrust Code, 1995;
Aussenwirtschaft,  1994, 331; Antitnrst & Trade Regulation  Report, :1993, Vol. 65,
No. 1628, Special Supplement7
of anticompetitive  effecs of the abuse of intellectual  properly rights.
V.  Dominance
Issues:
- Market dominance  - by one or more enterprises - is generally accepted. Divestiture  has not
become a common practice of competition policy even in countries, where authorities dispose
of this instrument.
- Dominance  might be defimenal to competition.  Dominant firms tend to increase their
market power (monopolizing). Restrictive practices harm customers  and'suppliers  or
competitors. Exclusionary  effects are obviously derimenal to intfiiational trade.
- Ruies against the abuse of a dominant position might be conduct or result-orieqted.  In this
context policies might aim at the protection of competition or competitors.
- Abusive practices-are  vertical restrainS or actions against competitors.  Exclusive dealings,
tying arrangements  as well as predatory pricing or rebate pnactices have to be mentioned-
OisJrimination practices have io be included. Art.86 EC-Iaw as well as the German law
include an abusi by exploitation of consumers. This view, however, might easily result in
price controls.
- Practically it is difficult to ascertain a conduct of predatory pricing (see n{ZGcase)'.'
Antitrust prictice, however,  has developed some appropriate standards. With regard to trade
issues it is clear, that effic'ient rules against predatory  Prlcing may nrbstihrte antidumping
rules which include  the risk of protectionist  abuses by petitioners and antidumping authorities.
Options:
- The US-I-aw contains general prohibitions  against monopolizing; separately it deals wittt
vertical resbaints. This approach extends the abuse by conduct-aprproach to non-dominance-
It seems to be more appropriate,  however, to start from market structure.
- Art.86 of the EC-Treaty may serve as a model. Is application should be sfictly conduct-
oriented. Exploitation  abises,- however, should be excluded.  The denomination of specific
practices might be subject of further discussion.
VI.  Merger Policy
Issues:
- It has to be questioned, if time for a real internationd  merger policy atready h-as come-
Merger policy is the instrument  of competition  policy which comes very close to industrial
polic-ies.  These policies are by their nature still national ones. Consequently,  there are
lonsiderable  divergencies  with regard to mergers in competition  law. Different standards are
applied. They might be competition-oriented  fike in the European Uni9l or they are
cbnsidered  aja part of a broader economic policy. In tf,e latter case the decisive criterion is
the public interest strndard.
- Considering this background any endeavour  to bring about a convergence of substantative
rules does not seem to be appropriate. Developments and progress might be achieved in the
Commission ABl. 1985 L 374118-23;  ECJ Case C-62l68, l99l ,33598
area of process, but not in zubstance-
Options:
- Any regulation in the area of merger policy might build upori ttre OECD-Study  by
WooilWistr recently submitted.  Regulations have to be brought about step by step.
- A converg.n.. of procedural tequiremeots has to have priority. This is particularly
important *itf, rrgrti to notificatibns.  Thresholds, time limits, and specifications of
information should be harmonized.
- All relevant pioposals agree on the necessity of a close cooperation  of al! competition
authorities conierned. Cooperation has to refer to an exchange of relevant information, an
understanding  on appro,priite investigations based on mutual assistance, and on harmonized
rules on confidentiality.
Vn. public Undertakings/State-Sanctioned Monopolia/Stdte Action
lssues:
- Undertakings under government control dispose of a special stahrs. In principle they are
financially inOependeni,and in practice they cannot go.banlcrugt- T,herefore they, can behave
on rrtk.ir irrespectively of business  aspects. It might be questioned, whether they should be
obliged to behave according to market principles.
- En-terprises  to which the state granted exciusive rights are in a similar position. They are
free from market restraints and may use their powers to impede cornpetition.
- It niight be argued that these particular  sinntions of enterprises in the economy reflect
specifiJpublic  iriterests. This means, that market-oriented  rules will not be appticable or at
least not to their full extent.
- Sute owned enterprises  and granted monopolies  should be considered as instrumenS of
national economic policies. Control and influence of governments will be used to pursue
public interess and to impose respective conduct on their enterprises  and monopolies:
bompetition  law particularly  on an international basis has to decide, to which extent state
influence on markets should be regulated.
Options:
- in international competitive order might impose the obligation on public undertakings and
state-sanctioned monopolies to behave according to ma*et principles. It has to be recognized,
however, that a broad 
-discretion 
dercrmined  by a businass judgement rule has to be respected.
It might be diffrcult, therefore, to enforce this kind of obligation.
- ThtEc-Treaty goes much further . fut.37 provides the elimination of all exclusive trading
righs and *onopoti"s. Of course,  this remedy will not be avaitabte  on an international  level.
- ett.gO of the 
-EC-Treaty 
starts from the aszumption of an umestricted application of the
competition rules. There- is one exemption only for resfaints of competition which are
.ppiopri.t , indispensible an proportional to meet a specific public purpose.  (Art.90 Sec.2
dC-fieaty). The Draft International Antitrust Code is following this line. It has to be
recognized, however, that the application of zuch an exemption requires a definition of public
interesls independently from national  aspects.
- The authorization of anticompetitive  behaviour by states presents a specific problem which
in particular has been dealt with by the US-State Action Doctrine. The EC-Iaw addresses this
problem only with regard to public undertakings and state-surctioned monopolies. Sates are9
not permitted to influence these undertakings in a way, which is contrary to the Common
Uaricet rules of competition.  This approach will surely cover the most freq'uent forms of state
action and should be extended to all undertakings  independently of any institutionalized  state
influence.
Closing remarks:
Obviously the formulation of substantive nrles depends heavily on existing institutions. This
is true for measures of enforcemeot as well. Some allusive remarts have already been made
in the context with specific rules. In general, it should be made clear, that gndual stgns seem
to be appropriate. They range from regist ation or notification to investigations, publications,
recomrln&tioos, and prohibitions. There should be a discussion, which of these measures
of enforcement shall be auributed to which of the above mentioned  restraints of competition.l0
ANNEX 2
Reflection paper of Professor Jenny
The relationship between trade policy and competition policy raises sereral substantial
problems.
l)  First the objectives  of the two rypes of policy are not the same. Whereas in most
countries anticust law and competition policy are designed to promot€ market structures
orprocesses  which will lead toeconomic  efficiency  and are notprimarily concerned with
fairness, t.ade policy.is concerned  with naxinizing  the op'portunities for intenrational
g-ade (securing-market  access) and, to a certain extent, with fairness (for example in
antidumping  Procedures)
Some horiiontal anticompetitive practices tend to restrict market access (zuch as for
example  an.international:cartel'or  a concerted boyco$ by manufac0rers'of.  a country to
deal with distributors of their country who buy from foneign manufactrers) andtheir
elimination will improve both economic efficiency and market scCeSS;
But it is also true Orat sihrations which do not necessarily  impede competition (or
efficiency) nevertheless entail market access difficulties. For exaryle vertical restrains
of trade between a manufacturer and its distributors  or the existence of verticdly  related
firms in a country may be acceptable from the point of view of the national competition
laws (in particular when there are numerous competing national manufachrers)  but may
restrict market access for foreign firms.
2) Second, the scope of competition laws is restricted in many ways; Competition laws
usually aprpy to behaviour of firms or undertakings supplying  goods or services but not
to the-behaviour of buyers (whether private or public) or to acts of governments; What
is more, in each country, various types of rcgulations exerpt specific sectors from
antitrust laws or limit the scope fo'r competition  in secton which are not exemped. So
access to markets can obviously be impaired by bebaviour or acts of government which
cannot be caught by antitrust laws (whether at a national or an international level).
3) Third, competition policy and competition  laws do no! discriminate  among firms
according to their nationality whereas trade policy does. Cornpetition  policy enforcers
are indifferent  as to the functioning of a market on which there are l0 fiflns of cqual
sizes from the same county and the functioning of a market on which there are say eight
national firms and two foreign firms. From a trade policy perspective  the two situations
are different.
4) Fourth, competition policy and trade policy use different yardsticks  to judge reality.
Thus antitrust laws tend to rely on the consideration of martet proc€sses (do the firms
act independrn ty) and market structures (does a m€rger lead to the creation of a
dominant position) to determine whether a situation restricts competition.  Trade5)
ll
specialists rely on performances  to determine  whether or not a remedy  is needed (if there
ae no significant American exports to Japan then the situation must be corrected).
Fifth, remedies  in the trade aea and the competition area are quite different. Whereas
remedies in the competition laws are typically desigped to increase competition (through
inlonctions  or penalties), remedies "agiinst rinfait practices ake the form of restrictions
oi ..r"r, to O. import market" ot "6f negotiated global import or export targg{" (G'
Feketekuty,  "fire niw Trade Agenda",  Group of Thirty, Occasional  Paper, Washington
DC) which often reduce competition  or prevent it.
Consequences of these observations
The problem of trade in its relation to competition is ortremely-complex.and.not fully
understood. What is clear is that one has to distinguistl  between the objective of fairness
and the objective of efFrciency which are in cerain cases consistent  and in other cases
inconsistent; berween acs oi states (subsidizing, not enforcing  competition nrles at
home, regulating etc...) and acts of firms (dumping, plrticipating  in an international
cartel; Ut&fing-artificially  access to a market etc...); between acts originating in the
exporting country or in the importkig county ot truly international acts.
I do not know at this point of serious empirical studies analyzing which type of
behaviour or acts are ttri most frequent and/or the most imporAnt when considering
impedimenS to free trade. Yet such a s;tudy would be extremely valuable (in this relpect
oni could recommend  that a research program "on the causes and costs of various tlpes
oiimpeOimen6  to international  trade;should  be unJertaken analogous tolhe "Research
on thi cost of Non-Europe'  which the EEC commissioned at the end of the eighties).
Given their diversity, there is no reason to believe that all of th9 acts and behaviour
which impede international trade and/or competition  can !e treated the same way. This
means that different types of measures and/oi insti$tional arrangements must_be lought
simultaneously. Thij means that there are several fora where the question of trade and
competition should be simuluneously examined.
The prospect  for an agreed set of international  competition principles (appyrng to firms
of trading nations) w[ich would significantly  and simulaneously  {evelog.competition
and ensuie fairness and access to markes in international  trade at the multilateral level
is limited (see, for example E.M. Craham and J.D. Richardson  "Summary of Project
on International  Competition Policy", lnstitute for International Economics).
Whereas some common mle could conceivably emerge in the area of horizontal practices
of firms (such as a ban on horizontal cartels whether national or international, export
ca@ls and import cartels), there will be a lot of difficulties to find common rules in the
areas of vertiial resraini of trade or of abuses of dominant  positions both because there
is no consensus  among economists  on the appropriate  measures and because there may
be conflicts between measures which could be considered to increase competition  and
efficiency and measures which could be conceived to ensure market access'
The likelihood of a consensus on the substance of rules governing international trade and
II)m)
t2
competition will be increased if a larger proportion of the trading nations have domestic
.o*p"tition laws and if these laws are mori similar. Thus it appears that encouraging
.onu.rg.n.e of national laws is possible  a prerequisite and certainly  a facilitating device
to furthlr the cause of free trade among nations.  Valuable work in this area can be done
within the context of OECD and possibly within the UNCTAD.
Simultanzously  in each nation a gteater consistency  must be achievod  betrreen  the rules
governing competition  and the rules governing  antidumping.
The prospect for a significant role for the WTO (or a WTO affiliated organization)  in
the direct enforcemeni of muurally agreed upon int€mational compeition  rules ap'p$ing
to firnrs of trading nations is remote for various reasons. On the one hand, the direct
enforcement  of these rules by an international body implies that this body either hs
extensive investigatory  and enforcemeot powers in the nation of the alleged offending
firms or that it can reiy on the compeition authorities of t[at country to use their.own
investigatory  powers .i tltr teqoest of Ure int€rnational  body to enforce the international  '
taw ag-ainst-domestic  firms. 
-Both'solutions 
imply that th9 trading countries  grve up
natiorial sovereignty. Whereas  zuch a solution is possible in the context of voluntary
,bilateral or regionai  agre€ments,among  countries having.similar  levels of'development
and/or common borders, it seems much more diffrcult to achieve at a world level.
It would seem that a system in which national authorities enforced the international  nrles
themselves (i.e. these rules would be provisions voluntarily integrated into their
respective  national competition laws) would be preferable. It is probably easier to
convince two countries tnat each should have a provision in its domestic competition law
prohibiting export cartels than to convince them to agree to an international  law
(enforced by an international  body) prohibiting  export cartels.
Along those lines I would endorse some of the proposals s€t forth by E. Fox (in
Comparative  Competition  and Trade Policy Projec$. (item 2 : these consensus
principles should Ue incorporated by the contracting  nations into their national antitrust
i.*r i...X item 6 : Nations whose commerce is injured by consennrs  wrongs launched
from or in another conmding nation should be accorded the right to request
enforcement of the injuring nation's antitrust law and, failing satisfaction,  they should
be accorded  the right in the iirjured nation to seek enforcement of its antitrust law; item
8 : nations should accept  as permissible use of national law to reprchend [acts of persons
of another contracting nation performed  largely on the territory of the lafer nationl if
the acts are wrongs under [the international  agreement] or facunl wrongs under the law
of both the injuring and the injured nation and they significantty  affect the regulating
nation's commerce).
The role of tbe international body (with regard to firms behaviour) would then be
uniquely:
1) to establish procedures which have to be followed by the national authorities having
jurisdiction over the frms when they investigate cases in which a foreign
government  (or a foreign firm) alleging an illegal conduct in international tade
causing harm in is domestic  markets has requested the procedings  (for example13
which data must be gathered  by the national authority prior to making a decision);
2) to verify that these procedures have been followed;
3) to play a direct role only if it is found that
a) there was no national competition law or authority or no provision for
international  restraints of trade in the national law
b) no action was taken by the national authority on the complaint
c) the standard international  procedure was not followed by the national authority
(for example the relevant data was not gathered before the adoption of a decision).
IV) These solutions  are not incompafible with some of the proposals put forth by F.U.
Scherer in 'Competition  Policies for an Integrated World Economy" although, on the
whole, Scherer assigns a larger role to the international body (which he calls
International Competition Policy Office) in the enforcement  area (wrt_! the assumed
collaboration  of national authorities)  than what we have zuggegted  is feasible.
One of the interesting proposals of Scherer is proposal 2 : " ... dl substantial  single-
: nation export and import cartels and atl cartels operating across national boundaries must
be registered and the mechanisms of their operations  must be documented with the'
ICPO." (and made public).  Indeed  as he points out (quoting Judge Brandeis)" Sunlight
is said tl be the best disinfectant; Electric light the most efficient policeman".
V) The above proposals are directed at solving one of the international trade problems (i.e.
frictions wiict arise from anticompetitive  behaviors by firms). Now as we mentioned
earlier there are probably many other sources of trade frictions (zuch as national
regulations on nonns and standards,  government zubsidies, acs of govemments  in
procurement markeb etc...). These other sources of frictions or of distortions are likely
io increase with the degree of state intervention in market mechanisms. Thus
coordinated deregulation and privatizations should be promoted-
The WTO seems to be the appropriate forum to define rules on the acceptable  behaviour
of government and to enforce them.l4
ANNEX 3
Reflection paper of Professor Petersmatrn
Issue: What type of approach should bc followed to echieve intcrnationd rules on
.orp"tihon?  -'eroposals  for a .building block aprproach'
a) The WTO aims at a deener 'inteSrated  afrlrroach"
For half a century, the post-war system of international economic cooperation  rested on
,ipori, norldwide .gt it  ns -O iottihrtio* for the intenrational movement of goods,
services,  persons, ."pilt and payments. International  competition policies relatingllg goods,
services, investment -O iot ttoi tA property have also Sg 
re-earded as sepafate-' This post-
*rrr.p,f,io.ch differs from the EC's ;integration appr@ch",'which  underscores ttre mufinlly
supporting role of the liberalization of go6ds, se",'ic'es, persons' investments  and of common
co'nipetiti6n rules for market integratioi. It also differs from the, albeit less comprehensive,
inteirateO regulation of the internationat movements  of goods, services,  persons: investnents
and related payments, intellectual  property righ!, elvlonmgnAl and competition  problems
in the 1994 Agreement establishing uie worto Trade orgaryStion (: wTo). The wT0's
"integrated afrroach" and acempi at "deeper integration" have increased the need for
oornfetition nries protecting  market access and market presence in the context of WfO law'
The EC's experience in the international regulation of economic inrcgration, and in
netotiating and administering international trade igfeemen6 with supplementary "competition
rui-es" (in the broad sense, 
-as 
used in Articles 85 ff of the EC Treaty, covering both go'
vernmental and private anticompetitive  practices), is unique in the world. tA gignificance goes
fu beyond economic  atgumens (such as promoting economic efficiency and-consumer
welfari through deregdafron  and undistorted competition).  The respectiveprovisions in the
EC Treaty, n" gei Agreement, the 'Europe Agreemcnts', tb€ EC's Free Trade Area
AgreemenS with EFTA-countries, the Agreemen! 01 Partrrership  an! Cqo.Oggtion with
Rissia, in the bilateral EC-USA Agreemint,  and also ttre unilateral ap'plication  of EC
competition law to foreign anticompetitive  practices offel a variety of complementary
multilateral, bilateral  anO initaterat approaches to 'trade and competition",  which can serve
as "building blocks" for negotiations on worldwide competition rules. The "European acquis
"o..unaut"ire' 
of liberal traoe anO competition  rules, the need for international  cooperation
betrneen EC and foreign antitrust authorities in the international enforcement of EC
competition law, and tnJ nc's interest in improving  a!9es: to fmeign markets and a "level
plrying field", by inducing other countries to enforce effective  competition  laws, suggest that
the EC is in a bettcr position than any other country to initiate negotiations on worldwide
competition rules.
b)l5
The reasons for combining trade and competition rules in a regional context are likewise valid
in the WTO context. For instance:
aa) Rules on the liberalization of private market access barriers and distortions are a
logical complement  to the liberalization of governmental  tariffs and non-tariff trade
barriers and have proven to be essential for the integration of markets, Thus, the General
Agreement  on Trade in Services (GATS) explicitly recognizes that "effective  market
access' (Article XIX) rnay not be achieved without sup,plementary  nrles on
anticompetitive  business practices (Article IX), 'monopolies and exclusive  senrice
zuppliers'  (Article VIII). The Agreement on Trade-Related  Aspocts.of Intellectual
Property RighS CIRIPS) explicitly acknowledges  that its objective "to reduce distortions
'  to international  trade' (Preamble) requires  rules on e.g. the "control of anti-competitive
practices in conEachral licences" (Article 40).
bb) Competition rules can help to fill 'gaps" in trade policy rules (cf. Article 90 EC
Treaty) and, io view of competition  policy's focus on consumer rights, to overcome the
"prod-ucer bias" of trade rules (cf. Article 91 EC Treaty). The WTO Agreement includes
a large number of competition  rules which deal with trade-related competition  issues in
an unsystematic piecemeal manner
cc) Trade nrles (such as those of the W-fO) can provide a negotiating forum, a "policy
review mechanism" and a dispute settlement  tystem for negotiating,  coordinating,
zupervising and enforcing international competition  rules.
dd) Reciprocal international competition rules are Decessary for reforming domestic
competition hws (e.g. exemptions for export cartels) and for rendering them more
effective (e.g. their application to foreign anticompetitive practices wi0rout jurisdictional
conflicts)'. ftrey neeO to be adjusted to alternative trade policy instnrments  (cf. the
prohibition of V-ERs, OMAs and compulsory cartels in Article 1l of the 1994 Agreement
on Safeguards).
c)  There seems to be enough lnlitical suplnrt for multilateral gompetition  rules
The territorial scope of the principles of EC competition law bas been continuously expanded
to now more than 25 countries in Europe. The EC Commission inrcnds to include compgtition
principles inspired by Articles 85, 86, 90 and 92 of the EC Treaty also in is future trade
agreerents wittr ttre iountries around the Mediterrurean  Sea and with successor  states of the
former Soviet Union. Most of these countries are GATT/WTO  confacting parties, or are
applying for GATT/WTO membership,  and are likely to support - for economic,  political
anO iegat re3sons (zuch as promoting a ruleoriented setlement of international  competition
policy conflics) -  the extension of an "integrated aprproach" to the WTO. The Norttt
' On the ldomestic policy frrnction" of the "reciprocity principle" and of reciprocal
"package deal negotiations" for overcoming  rlomestic political opposition  to trade
and competition policy reforms see: E.U. Petersmann, Why Do Governments Need
the Uruguay  Round Agreements, NAFTA and the EEA? in: Swiss Review of
International Economic Relations (Aussenwirtschaft)  1994, 3l-55.l6
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)  and some other free trade area agreem€ntsi,  sych as the
Austratia-New Zealand Clbser Economic Relations  Agreement (= ANZCERIA) and the
Andean common Market Agreement,  itre also based on integrated sets 0f .trade 
and
competition rules, albeit of a iess ambitious  character  compared with those contained in the
EC Treaty. In its recently published assessment of the UnrgUay Round Agreepents' the
UNCTAD SecrehriatconctuOeC Uut "there appears to be a general consensus  among States
that negotiations should be undertaken oo - .gf.t-*t on trade'related  competition policy
*Oer tie aegis of OeWortd Trade Organization.'2  This assesbment might 1rot Il  be shared
by all competition policy bureaucraciis (notably in the U9Ol. Yet, an F'C initiative for
multilateral competition i.ri.i it U1AV to Ue zupporteO by a large number of developed and
less-developed  counEies.
the WTO
An attempt to snpplemcnr  and mend the existing unilateral, bilateral and plurilateral
.ppr*rUri ty woiti*iOe competition  rules should UuitO on the existing experiences  and aim
ai'tfreir progressive extension'to  like-minded countriesi("building  block approach")"  Just as
the GATT l94Z was modelled on the more than 30 bilateral trade agreements concluded by
the usA on the basis of its 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, the development  of
worldwide  competition mles in the WTO should build on, and would be facilitated by' a
progressive muitilateralization of the existing bitateral agreements  on cooperation.between
iodpetition authorities and on the regional competition rules of European integration' The
negotiation of additional bilateral and multilateral cor^rpetition rules are complementary
strategies which should be punued simrrltaneously'
Such negotiations  will benefit from the preparatory w-ork by OECD and UNCTAD' But thEir
objectivl of integratinjraOe anO .orprtitioo rules, for instance by coordinatinq  trade policy
an"d competition  pofic! remedies and-prorccting market access and undistorrcd  competition
more effbtivety'through  an "integraGd apptoach", can be-aghieved only by mjlqng such
rules part of thi wroigreementl Such a ;wto ap'proach" is made possible by Article II
of the WTO Agreement, according to which "Pltrilarcral Trade Agfeemen!1" negotiated
among a limited number of WTO memben may be inrluded in Annex 4 as an 'integral part"
of the WTO Agreement without aiating 'eithCr obligations  or rights for Members that have
not accepted Gm' (Article II:3). Suchl Phrilateral Agreement on Coryerition and Trade
(= pnCt) could become - togetLt with the proposed rygoti4* of a plurilateral agrcement
on cross-border investment - 6e still "missing pillar' of the GATT-WTO system. As in EC
law, such competition  and investment rules could gfeatly shengthen and-complement other
p*l "f 
Oe wrO world rade and legal sysem_ (e.q. .the GATr, GATS and TRJPS
igrr.r.ns)  and facilitate the funne liberalization of trade in goods and services.  The PACT
coutO Ue based on the fo.llowing "building blocks":
a)
' The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment,  UNCTAD 1994' at
p.243.l7
to trade-rel4ted RBPs
The 1960 GATT Decision on 'Arrangemen8 for .conzultations"  on restrictive business
practices (:  RBPs) "at the request of any contracting party... on a bilateral or multilateral
basis as appropriate" expticitly recognized "thatthe activities of international cartels and truss
may hamper the expansion of world trade and... thereby frustnate the benefits of uriff
reductions and of removal of quantitative restrictions or o(herwise  interfere with the objectives
of the General Agreement"'' In GATT dispute sefflement p'ractice, GATT nrles were
consistently constrneO as "provisions establishing conditions of competition", and GATT
dispute settlement procedures were also made available for complainS over certain
government-supported RBPs. The GATS and the TRIPS Agreeinent erplicitly deal with RBPs
and provide for consultation and dispute settlement procedues for complain6 over certain
RBPs.
A reaffirmation that RBPs may "nulli$ or impair" benefiS accnring under the WTO
Agreement and may be 'actionable"  under the WTO consultation and dispute sefilement
procedures, could be a logical starting point for a PACT. It would protect and strengthen the
market access commitments under GATT and GATS law by providing a multilateral forum
for consultations,:clispute  settlement proceedings and the progressive development  of caselaw
on trade'related  RBPs whenever  tbey impair the market acceSs commitments and,competition
mles of WTO law. A comprehensive  WTO jurisdiction to review trade-related  RBPs in goods
trade, services trade, trade-related investment measures (:  TRrMS) and trade'related
intellectual property  righs 1= TRIPS) could also promote an overall consistent interpretation
of the existing and future cornpetition  rules of WTO law. By reviewing tnade'related  RBPs
on a case-by-case basis, the case-law  could progressively  clarify to what extent the different
kinds of "violation complaints", ."non-violation complaints' and "situation complains"
available under GATf-WTO law may be appropriate remedies against trade-related RBPs.
b)  Multilateralization of Oie EC-USA Ageement Regarding the Application of their
Competition t:ws, with incentives for the ioining of third WTO members
The bilateral l99l 'Agreement benveen the Commission  of the EC and the Government of
the USA Regarding the Application of their Competition laws"', which needs to be
renegotiated anyhow following the EC Court ruling of 9 August 1994 which 'annulled Ote
act by which ttle EC Commission concluded this Agreement", could serve as a model for a
"Plurilateral Agreement' (in terms of Annex 4 to the WTO Agreement). It would be open
to all other WTO members which share the view "that the sound and effective enforcement
BISD 95/28
The text of the Agreement  was not published  in the EC's Officiat Journd. It is
reproduced e.g. in: World Competition 15 (September 1991), 155-162.
Case C-327l91, France vs. EC Commission, judgment of 9 August 1994 (not yet
published). The Court did not clarify that, notwithsanding  the infringement of the
EC's treaty-making powen and procedures, the agreernent must be presumed to
remain in effect under international  law.l8
of competition law is a matter of importance to the effrcient operation of their res:pective
markets and to trade between them" (Preamble).
The pACT would require the introduction of effective national competition laws and
independent competition  authorities,  where they do not yet exist, and would provide for the
applicability of rire WTO Dispute Senlement Understanding  (DSU) in order to make the
international notification, information,  cooperation and consulAtion requirements 'actionable"
and enforceable  under the DSU. The jurisdictional rules, coopwation.  requirements and
multilateral dispute sefilement  pnoceOures  could promote the avoidance  or resolution of
jurisdictionat *nni.tr resulting hom e.g. the proliferation of national merger control laws,
their unilateral 'extrate, ritorial" enforcement against foreign RBPs and from international
discovery efforts abroad. The PACT could also provide for the aprplicability  o{ the WTO
'Trade nohcy Review Mechanism" Otradc-rclatedcompetitionpoliciesof  contractingparties,
so that the inrcrface benreen  tnade and competition  rules could be regUlady reviewed both in
the PACT Commifee and in the Creneral Council of the WTO. Third WTO mernbers sttould
be invited to join the PACT. They could be afracted to do so e.g. by a commitment of
member counties to take the cooperatiori  betrreen competition  authorities into account in the
adminisfration  of their unfair trade laws. lncreased cooperation among competition authorities
would enhance legal secrnity for private €nt€rprises and reduce,the costs of'duplicate
investigations  and contradictory decisions.
c)  n agreed tist of internationel  srhstantive  miqimum conTretition  rules
The procedural,  institutional urd jurisdictional provisions  should be sup'plemented by agreed
minimum standards on substantive competition  rules for transborder  cases. Th€sc cottld be
.progressively  supplemented  urd should leave enough latifide to WTO members  to develop
their own competition  laws and apply "higbo' standards according to their particular needs.
The competition  rules should appty to all goods and services  sectors in order to enhance the
consistency  of trade and competition  rules. They should also apply to boft governmental  and
private anticompetitive  practices, since pubtic underhkings  and government-induced  RBPs
can distort tradeand competition  no less than private RBPs. A requirement to incorporate the
international rules into domestic laws and to enable their enforcement througb inde'pendent
domestic competition  authorities and courts should be supplemented  by a national treatment
obligation in the sense that domestic competition laws must treat transborder cases (e.g.
export cartels) no less favourably than domestic cases (e.g. legal voidness of both export and
import cartels).
In view of the detailed V/TO Agreement on Subsidies,  the PACT would not have to include
subsidy disciplines. It shoutd focus on per-se-prohibitions  of horizontal  "hard core carGls"
with an international  dimension (zuch as price fxing, output restraints, market sharing and
bid-rigging), agreed criteria and juriidictional  rules'for "rule of r@son" examinations  (e.9.
of horizontal cooperation agreements on research and development" joint ve'n$res, mergetrs,
abuse of dominance and non-price vertical restraints), monopolization  and public undertakings
(e.g. a rule similar to Article 90 of the EC Treaty). International  per-se-pnohibitions  of non-
price vertical reshaints and of abuses of dominant positions may neither be acceptable nor
desirable in view of the continuing  divergence  of views among economists  on their pro' and
anticompetitive  effects in concrete sinutions. Alternative  international  minimum standards for
"rules of reason" could specify procedures,  jurisdictional  nrles, presumptions and criteria tod)
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be observed in case-by<ase  examinations by domestic authorities  (e.g. for the balancing of
pro- and anticompetitive  effects, principles on "negative comity' and "positive comity"). At
the request of adversely  affected countries,  observance  of the procedures  and criteria could
be enforced  through cooperation:rmong  competition iuthorities and, ultimately,  through WTO
dispute settlement  proceedings
An alternative  approach could consist of ratlrer general competition  policy principles - e.g'
on the model of the EC's Europe Agreementt'  - 
-so 
Oat contracting parties could adjust their
respective implementing legislation-to theii particular needs and negotiate subquent  agreed
intirpretationi.  Refereo.e couru Aso be made to existing internationally agreed competition
rules, zuch as the UN "Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable hinciples  and-Rules  for the
Control of Resrictive Business Practices" of i980, or to the "Model I:w on Restrictive
Business Practices", prepared by UNCTAD's  "lntergovernmental  Group of Expetts on
Restrictive  Business iraitices", as guidelines for national competition laws.:Failure to
incorporate,  apply and enforce the internationally  agfeed principles  into domestic laws would
be actionabte anO sanctionable under thrc WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (: DSU).
Apart from the agreed zubSantive and procedural minimum standards (zuch as rights of
complaints,  privati action and judicial review),  each contracting  party would remain free to
introduce "*ghrt",national standards,and to adjust the rules,,procedures  and institutions to
its particular traditions  and neods.
Similar to GATT Article XXVru biS and GATS Article XIX, the PACT could explicitly
provide for periodic negotiations on additional competition nrles or 'specific commitments"
ielating to RBPs, zuch as national monopolies or companies with "exclusive or special
privileles" (Article XVII of GATT) which, even though not qr-ohiblted  ry-dtt GATT and
bets-taw, r&y restrict trade and competition and rnay be liberalized in exchange for
reciprocal concessions.  Such market access negotiations relating to RBPs are already taking
plaie bilaterally (e.g. in the context of the USA3 "structural Impediments  Initiative" vis-i-vis
iapan) as weliai iultilaterally (e.g. in the context of the GATS negotiations on 'market
access commitments"). tn ttrose RetOs where there is no consensus on general competition
rules, bilateral negotiations  on specific commitments  to be incorporated into the GATT and
GATS 'schedules of concessions"  might offer an alternative means for progressively
' See e.g. Article 62:l of the Agreement EC-Hungary:  "The following are
incompitible with the proper functioning of the Agreement,  in so far as they may
affect trade between the Community  and Hungary: (r) all agreements  between
underUkings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
between undertakings  which have as their objelt or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition; (ii) abuse by one or more undertakings  of a dominant
position in the terriiories of the Community  or of Hungary as a whole or in a
iubsantial part thereof; (iii) any public aid which distorts"... (O.J. of the EC No.
L347 of 3l December 1993, at l5).
' See UNCTAD document TD/B/RBP/81/Rev-3  of 2 August 1994'
additional market access commitments relating to RBPs20
liberalizing  RBps and for 'learning by doing". Such bilateral  commitments could serve as
models for future negotiations  on general rules.
e) No estahlishment  of an international comnetition authoriu
The actual enforcement of the PACT rules would remain prinarily a natign{ affair' The
pACT would coordinate national competition laws and poticies througF international
minimum standards  as well as tbrough inGrnational  notification, information  and cooperation
requirements among compegtion .itt otititt. The "positive comity" principle would entitle
" .o*t y adverself affeci.O UV a foreign RBf to request the forcign coutry concerned to
take enforcement actions ptonidrd for by its own lawi, to exarnine such a request hona fide
and to justiry its final decision. But there would be no legal obligation to proceed with the
enforcement action requested if the country concerned concluded that the international
minimum  standards -d iS domestic competition laws did not justify su9h ltion. Yet, the
pACT requirements of infonnation, 'positive comity" and o{ access to foreign competition
authoritiei and courts could also Ue naOe enforcable tbrougb the WTO dispute seslement
,ytt tn with its ultimate possibitity  o-f "cross-retaliation'  or authorization  of unilateral ("ex-
daterritorial") application of Oomistic competition  laws to foreigo RBPs (e.g- if the "positive
comity" obligations  under the PACT were not,fulfilled): The'WTO.dispute' settlement.and
enforiementlrocedures  could thus avoid the experience fu!".g. the competition  rules in the
bilateral  free trade area agreements  between the-EC and EFTA countries were not effectively
implemented in several fffA couneies (such as Switzerland). The enforcement mechanisms
at the national level (e.g. private actions for damages or for declaratory judgmenS  that
prohibited  cartels are not-enforceable  at law) and at the inrcrnational  level would complement
and reinforce each other.
In view of the continuing divergencies among domestic competition  la1v1 (e.S. regarding
abuses of dominanc"-Oion-ptiir  vertical tesuaints;  and among domesticinterpreations of
discretionary  "rules of reason" (e.g. regarding merger control and re$nrcturing),  a worldwide
competition  authority (e.g. on tlt toOtf of Ute EC or EEA Treaty) wi0t autonomous
investigation,  regulation  .oO de.ition-making  powers doel not appgll politically-acceptable
in the near future. Fronomically, it might even not be desirable because "regulatory
competition" within agreed internal'onat framework  rules woufd promote experimentation and
decentralized "tearniig by doing" and would reduce the risks of errors by centralized
authorities or of protitionist abuses of their discretionary regUlatory powers' Even in a
decentralized system based on national competition laws an.d- policies an! thgir
application to ;foreign;-RBpt,  uniform interpreAtio* Td {e Fofessive development of
glirerar pACT rules could be promoted through the PACT Commiuee  and the wTO
irechanisms for dispute settlement,  "authoritative Gterpretations", supervision  and negotiation
of additional rules. The pACT Commifiee  and WTO dispute seslement panels dealing with
"PACT disputes' must include competition poticy experts. Their expertise, traditional focus
on coosumer interests  and institutionalized  partiiipaUon  in the WTO sys{em could thereby
contribute  to the progressive  integration of trade and competition rules and policies'
f)  Fffective  dispute settlement  and enforcement nrles
The international notification, information, consultation,  "negative_  comity" and 'positive
comity" obligations,  as well as the inrcrnational  minimum standards for substantive  domestic2r
competition  rules, should be enforceable  and sanctionable  under the WTO dispute sefilement
procedures.s The dispute settlement and enforcement  problems of a PACT are largely a
function of the procedural and substantive obligations included into a PACT. As a
'plurilateral agreement"  in terms of Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement, the dispute settlement
procedures  of1 pnCf could deviate from the general "Dispute  Seslement Understanding"
(DSU) in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement and provide for special rules so as to meet
specific  concerns of competition  policy.
The relationship  betneen the enforcement of domestic competition  nrles through domestic
courts (e.g. in the USA and the EO and international  dispute seslement procedures (e.g.
international  complaints over the alleged inconsiSency of domestic cotfi decisions with the
international  minimum  standards of a PACT AgreemenQ  raises difficultprocedural  questions
(e.g. prior exhaustion of domestic judiciat rcmedies before'the invocation of international
Oisputl settlement procedures?) and subSantive law questions (e.g. regarding  the appropriate
standatdr of review and remedies at the international levet). Governments  and fade lawyers
have had 45 years of practical experience  with such procedural and legal issues in the context
of the GAI-T/WTO  dispute settlement  system where, for instance in the field of antidumping
and.coudtervailing  duty law, lower court decisions were challenged  in GATT panel rulings
and subsequently revised tbrougb US'Srryreme  Court'decisions  in conformity with'the
international  GATT dispute settlemeht frndings'. Competition  lawyers, eqpeciafly when they
are unfamiliar with the GATT dispute se$lement system, seem to be scepical towards such
international  dispute settlement  ptocedotes and point to the fact that, so far, the conciliation
procedures in ihe 197911986 OECD Guidetines on C.ooperation on RBPs Affecting
internadonal Trade appear to have never,been invoked. In order to accommodate zuch
concerns,  the internatioo"t dirput sefilement procedures of a PACT might be infoduced
progressively and refined in tlie light of the practical experience. They could also deviate
-to1a 
ttr. general WTO dispute s€ftlement  system if the DSU rules, for insAnce the possibility
of parallel invocation of both domestic and international dispute settlement procedures,  should
be considered inappropriate for a PACT-
Especially  the following four categories of international  disputes could arise and should be
actionable under the diqpute settlement system of a PACT:
aa) Disputes over international procedural obligations
In case of non-notified foreigo RBPs, or if information on foreign RBPs is inadequate
or contested,  the adversety  affected country could invoke the notification, information,
consultation  and "positive comity" obligations of the PACT. If the notification and
information requiriments were not voluntarily met, it could request either the PACT
Committee or a PACT dispute settlement panel to order qpecified notifications  and
" See E.U.Petersmann,  Reflection  paper on Issue No.4: Enforcement  of Inrcrnational
Competition Rules through GATT-WTO  Dispute Seslement Procedures, September
1994.
" See e.g. E.U.Petersmann, GATT dispute settlement proceedings in the field of
antidumping  law, in: common Market law Review 1991, 69-114.22
informations.  If invocation of the "positive comity" obligations would not lead to
enforcement activities by the other country, the adversely affected country could either
request a finding Uy a fnCf panel on whether the non-enforcement  of domestic
competition rules'viotates the international  minimum standards of the PACT; or it could
unilaterally apply its own competition laws to the foreign RBPs provided this is
consistent with the 'negative comity" obligations  of the PACT. A trird option colld be
to resort to domestic ioort pro.oodiogr  in tne foreign comtry for judicial rwiew of
whdther the alleged ngps ari furconsistent  with the domestic  competition law. A.delicate
question  would L no,r to regulate  the relationship  bdween  these variotrs remodies (e.g.
free choice? successive or alternative  use?). It should be noted that WTO law already
includes various requirements of access to domestic collrts and, in geieral, p"Tttt
simulAneous recourse by privarc parties to domestic coufts and WTO by WTO members
to dispute settlement proceedings in the WTO-
bb) Disputes over international  per-se-prohibitions
Claims of violations of international  per-se-prohibitions (e.g. of horizonal "hard core
cartelsl with.an international  dimensionl could.be examined by a PACT dispute
seclement panel. A panel finding of :such a.violation,would  entail the inrcrnational
"secondary obligationi" recognized in GATT-WTO law (i.e. cessatim olqg lleg{ 
act'
possibility of aulhorization of countermeasures pending th9 withdrawal  of the illegal act,
iuch as zuspension of reciprocal market aocess obliptions). The PACT could also
provide, as iuggesed by Sirt-eon BrinSn, for additional civil law sanctions,  zuch as that
'nnes 
viotating-per-se-prohibitions  are not enforceable at law. Such a rule would have
the political aO"anAgebf making domestic coufts ptttg-f th. int€roatiooal  enforcement
system. BoOt WTO panels and-domestic courts would have the powq toprder.the
zubmission of relevant factual informations, or to decide on thc basis of presumptions
and rules on the allocation of the burden of proof.
cc) Disputes over international  mles-of-rehson 
'
In those areas where there is no international  consensus  on justiciable  per-se-prohibitions
of RBps, the pACT would only define minimum standards for national rules'of-reason,
principles of international  comity and rules on conflicts of juridiAioo (e.g. in case of
hrtgo control). These international nrles would also be enforceable through PACT
Oispute settlement panels and, ultimately,  througb the authorization of countermeasurcs.
Bui, since Ure apptication of the domestic nrles-of-reason  would be guided only by
international  minimum standards aird would require the appraisal of complex economic
matters, the international PACT panel wotrld have to ap'ply a limited standard of review
with due deference to the national scope of discretion  (e.g. review by PACT panels of
whether the relevant procedural  nrles have been cornplied with, whether the statement
of the reasons for the national decision is adequate, whefher  the ftcts have been acurately
stated, whether there has been any 'manifest error of ap'praisal" of the facts or a "misuse
of powers"). Due to the national scope of discretion, panel frndings of violations of the
inrcrnational minimum standards would, in most cases, only enAil an obligation to
reconsider the domestic  decision with due regard to the panel findings. The consistency
of the new decision of the domestic conpeCtion authority with the international
minimum standards could be re-examined by thr existing PACT dispute setlement panel23
within a prescribed period of time.
dd) Disputes over nullification  or impairment of market access commitments as a result
of RBPs
One advantage of integrating  trade and competition  rules in a WTO PACT Agreement
would be to sfengthen  the linkage betrveen Barket access commitments and RBPs so as
to better secure effective market access and undistorted competition. This could be
achieved in various ways, such as:
"violation conplaints" under ,the PACT diqpute sefrlement sysrcm whenever the
substantive or procedural obligations  of the PACT are violated;
"non-violation  complaints'  under Article XXIII of GATT in case of "nullification or
impairment" of GATT concessions  through unforeseen srbsequent governnental
measures which, even though not inconsistent with GATT law (zuch as a production
subsidy, establishment  of a state hading monopoly, granting of fddedstorting  special
privileges to import-competing enterprises, non-enforcement  of PACT obligations to
prevent private market access restrictions), adversely affect the competitive  conditions
which could be reasonably  expected underthe reciprocal GATT concession;
"non-violation complains"  pursuant to Articles IX. )OflII of GATS if unforeseen
subsequent governmental  measures, even if not inconsistent with GATS law (e.g. non-
enforcement of PACT obligations to prevent private market access rcstrictions), "nullify
or impair" the competitive conditions that could be reasonably  expected under the GATS
Schedules of Concessions;
"violation complaints" pursrant to Articles VIII. XXIII of the GATS whenever
monopolies and exclusive service zuppliers  restrict competition  in a manner inconsistent
with PACT obligations and contrary to Article VItr of GATS (which should be construed
in conformity  with the PACT competition  rules among PACT member  countries);
"violation  complains"  and/or "non-violation complain8"  under Article 64 of the TRIPS
Agreement if, for instance, abuses of intellectral property rights and anti+ompetitive
practices in conbactual  licences were inconsiSent with PACT rules and, among PACT
member  countries, might therefore also be recognized  to be inconsistent  with e.g. Article
8 of the TRIPS Agreement, or to be "actionable"  under Article 64 of the TRIPS
Agreement  (note that Article 64:2 exctudes 'non-violation  complaints' for a period of
5 years after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement on I Jaouary 1995).
The 'nullification or impairment' of GATT and GATS market access commitnents or
TRIPS obligations as a result of RBPs and of non-enforcement  of PACT obligations
could therefore become an additional  cause of action under the WTO dispute settlement
system. Thus, even if a PACT dispute setlement  panel could rct find a violation of an
international per-se-prohibition or nrle-of-reason (e.g. because a vertical restraint of
competition in a foreign country does not specifically violate the domestic and
international competition  rules), ttrere might be a case of "nullification or impairmant"
of specific market access commitments negotiated  under GATT law or GATS law. This
is particularly so in the field of intrnational trade in services because, in contrast to
GATT tariff bindings and the comprehensive GATT prohibitions  of non-tariff trade
barriers, market access commitments  under the GATS prohibit only the six kinds of
market access restrictions listed in Article XVI GATS and can be easily undermined by24
other governmental or private market distortions. The bona-fide and reciprocity
principles underlying the past GATT case-law on nnon-violation complaints" could be
progrissivety reirned and developed in WTO and PACT practice through agreed
definitions and dispute seslement practiceto.
Issue: Enforcement  of internationat co.petition nrles through GATT-WTO dispurc
settlement Procedures?
Competition and frade fPeCf)
Given,the practical experience that internationirl  competition nrles (such as those in
UNCTAD'JRBp  Code and in the EC's free trade area agreements with EFTA countries) may
remain ineffective unless they are zupplemented by effective enforcement and diqpute
settlement procedures, enforceabitity of international  competition nrles - both at the
internationdl  andat the domestic level -. mustbe a primaqy concero in fuhrre negotiations on
such rules. ,Would the incorporation of ai PACTT! into Annex 4 to the l994'Agreement
Establishing  the world Tradl organization (: wTo) congibute to the effectiveness  and
enforceability of internationd  competition rules?
The dispute settlement and enforcement problems of a PACT are largely a function of the
sub3tantive and procedural obligations included into such a PACT. The WTO's Dispute
Settlement Undentanding (:pSU), and the special and additional dispute settlement
procedures  in the "covered agleements" (such as the GATT, GATS and TRIPS Agement),
-offrt 
a wide variety of "political" and "legal' dispuB sefilement  methods:  consultations; gmd
offices; conciliation; mediation; panel procedures;  Appellate Body rerriew proccdures; legally
binding rulings and recommendations  by the Dispute Sefflemcnt Body (: DSB); arbiration;
righS 6f acc*s to national courts; private "independent  rwiew procedures"  (e.g. under the
Aleement on preshipment  Inspection); or national "challenge procedures' (e.9. under the
Agreement on Government  Procurement)r2.  Three poinb are important:
For a more detailed  analysis see: E.U. Petersmann, The Dispute Setlement
Systein of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT
Oitput Settlement System since 1948, in: Common Marketl-aw Review 1994,
ttil -tZU; Petersmann, Violation Complains  and Non-Violation  Cgmn-lains
in Public lnternational Trade law, in: German Yearbook of lnternational law
34 (1991) 175-229.
See: E.U.Peterslllatltt, Reflection  papef on Issue No.2: What type of approach
should be followed to achieve international rules on competition?  Proposals for
a "building block approach".
For a deAiled survey and analysis see: E.U.Percrslllalltl,  The Dispute
settlement  System of the world Trade organiz4tiol and the Evolution of the
GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948, in: Common Market I-aw
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a) The new "automatic" panel, appellate review and arbiration procedures offer more
eifective and quicker "legai methodi' for the settlement of international disputes among
governmen6  and for the enforcement  of dispute seillement rulings by the DSB than any other
international organization.  The additional "political methods" of dispute settlement  (e'g' by
means of consultations and ageed dispute settlements)  are helpful whenever the parties are
prepared to negotiate  a dispute settlement-
b) The DSU leaves it to the parties to each "Plurilateral  Trade egfTt:ol--whether,  and
to what extent, their dispute seclement  proccdures will be governed by the Dlu or by special
and additional dispute settlement ptocedotes. The parties to a PACT would thus remain free
to negotiate theirbwn  dispute seulemint rules. If they decide to apply the DSI{, gnly thory
members that are pafties to the Plurilateral Trade Agreement t"I F{tiplg in decisions and
actions taken by the DSB with respect to zuch disputes (cf. Article 2 DSU)'
c) The WTO Agreement  already includes an increasing number of "competition  rules" e.g'
in the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection,  the GATS and the TRIPS Agreement' which
are "acti6nable" and enforceable  undCr the DSU. Inclusion of a PACT into Annex 4 of the
WTO. Agreement would contribute to the overall consistency of international_ fade and
competition rules and ttreir respective dispurc seftlement'and  enfucement procedrnes- Also
some of the "new subjects" in the WTO's work program - such as the proposals to negotiate'
rules on cross-bordei investments and hade-related environmental nrles in funre "WTO
Rounds" - have important  competition  policy dimensions. A PACT outside the WTO legal
system could not cover the 'inierface pioblans" of competition rules and the WTO's iules
on t .d, in goods and services,  trade-related investment measures, environmental  measures
and intellecn A prop.ny righs. A separate PACT dispute settlementsystrem outside the WTO
could even run intoconflici  with the-requirement in Article 23 of the DSU to zubmit disputes
over "nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements.-.  to the rules and
procedures of this Understanding"  -
2.  Past GATT Dispute Settlement Practice relating to RBPs
The GATT Contracting  Parties have so far never systernatically  examined the possibl'ity of
drawing up additional -Ceff 
rules on restrictive business practices.  Most GATT rules and
Tokyo-Round Agreements set out governmental  obligations  for the treatment of goods'
Obligations  for enterprises (e.g. in Caf1. Article XVID, for non-governmental-standardizing
bodiEs (e.g. Articl.J of in. fgzg Agreement  on Technical Barriers) and for restrictive
business pra.ticer, such as price undertakings by exporters J..g, e{9le 4'.5-1979 Sutsidiy
Code) or 
'"price 
undercutting by dumped inpors; (e.g. Articf e 3:2 1979 Antidumping  Code) '
are exceptional in GATT law and in tne l97g Tokyo Round Agreements' GATI hw does not
require iont .aing parties to have national competition  laws. If srch competition  laws exist,
Ceff hw prohibitito rp'pty thpm to imported iooOs in a less favourable manner than to like
domestic products (Article III). In a Decision oit960, the GATT C-ontracting Parties adopted
"Arrangements for consultations"  on restrictive  business practices 'at the request of any
Review 1994, ll57-124.26
contracting party...on a bilateral or a multilateral basis as appropriate"-r3 These arrangments
recognize-'ttrrt itt. activities of international  cartels and trusts may hamper the-expansion of
world tade and...thereby frusrate the benefits of. tariff reductions and of' removal of
quantitative restrictions oiotherwise  interfere wit!1!re objgctivt of tbe General Agreement";
but they have so far never been invoked in GATT practice. The GATT dispute sefilement
practice  tras, nonetheless, confiibuted to clarifying c€rBin interrelationships  benreen trade and
competition problems in GATT law- For instance:
a) As stated in the 1990 oilseeds Panel Report, "CONTRACTING PARTIES  have
consistently interpreted tne U.si. pro"isioos of the General Agreement  on restrictive trade
measures ., pr6-itio* establishing conditions  of competition"{  so that an infringement of
GATT obligations r"trifiog . potirtiAfy adverse change in the competitive conditions  is
considered to constitute a jrini-facie  case of 'nullification or impairment"  without a need
to show a decline in the 
"olume 
of trade ("trade damage")'
b) The interrelationships  betrreen the liberalization  of trade policy Edo 
measures and
internal governmental diitortions are gi.en into account to some extent. Thus, GATT dispute
senlemeit practice has esrablished 3 conditions  - that (l) a tariffconcession  w-af legotiated,
.(2) agovernmental measure, not inconsistent with GAT[,'had been'introducod  zubsequently
*iti.tt upset the competidve relationship betrreen the "bound" product and directly
competitive  products  from other origins,.and  (3) the measure could not have been reasonably
anticipated Uy tne party to whom tnr Ui"Oiog was made at the time of the negotialion of the
tariff concesiion -- 
ior "non-violation  complaints"  under Article )ooll:l,b in order !o
;;1o|-;Gt*ve benefis, which could be reasonably  opectod from recip-rocal tariff
bindingr, from being undermined by unforeseen production  subsidie.s on the "@ncession
product" or by other trsdedistorting measures.tr
.c) The GATT dispute settlement VS:t can be invoked also against cerain govenrment-
'supporteO 
private re'straints  of competition. Thus, the 1988 Panel Report on fapanese export
restrictions  on semi-conductors  concluded that the "administrative guidance' by the Japanese
GATT Basic Instruments  and Selected Documents, gth Supplement, atp.28 (:
BrsD 95/28).
BISD 37 5/86-132, at 130
See e.g. the 1990 Oilseeds Panel Report which noted that the provisions in
Articd XXIII:I,b, "as conceived by the drafters urd applied by 9"
CONTRACTING PARTIES, serve mainly to protect the balance of ariff
concessions. The idea underlying them is that the improved competitive
opporhrnities that can legitimately-be  expected  from a tariff tpncession can be
RustrateO not only by measures  proscribed by the Creneral Agreement but also
by measures consistint with that Agreement.  In order to encourage contracting-
p'.rti6 to make tariff concessioni they must therefore be given a right of
itdtot when a reciprocal  concession  is impaired by another contracting  party
as the result of the ipplication of ury measure,  whether or not it conflicts with
the General Agreement" (BISD 3718G132, st ln)-
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government in support of private "voluntary export restraints" on semi-conductors  was
inconsistent with GATT Article XI:1.r6 By confast, the 1988 "Good Offices Report by the
personal Representative  of the Director€eneral  on the Diqpute between  the EC and Japan
concerning iertain Pricing and Trading Practices for Copper in Japan" did not uphold the
EC's complaint against alleged Japa,nese government support of carrcl practices by Japanese
copper smelten; it concluded tnat ne high Japanese  import tariffs and domestic prices of
t nn.O copper, which enabled Japanese copper smelters to offer higher prics for the
purchase oI.opp"t concentrates  than their EC competitors, were not due to violations of
GATT rules or cartel practices.t'
3. Would the WTO 'T\isprrte Settlement llnderstanding' Provide an Adequnte  Framework
for the Enforcement of a PACT?
under a PACT and their impact on dispute settlement  procedures
Like GATT law, a PACT would be based on obligations  addressed  to governments, e.g. to
incorporate  agreed competition rules into their domestic laws, to properly enforce domestic
.orp"tition iaws in accordance with agreed criteria, to inform and cooperate with the
.orp"tition authorities of other conmcting parties, and O participate in PACT negotiations
and diqpute settlement proceedings.  This intergovernmental  nature of PACT obligations would
BrsD 35 S/l16-163
BrsD 36 Sll99-202
In contrast to the traditional GATT rules on trade in goods, the new WTO agfeements e.g.
on preshipment inspection,  GATS and TRIPS include - similar to competition  law - many
rules for the treatnrent of persons (e.g. service suppliers,  investors) and their private rights
(e.g. intellectual property righc). The WTO agreements ol trade in goods also include more
rulis referring to RBPs such as 'compulsory  import carlels' (Article 11 of the Agreement on
Safeguards),  or requiring the examination  of "trade restrictive practices  and cglnetition"  in
determinations of injury" (Article  15 of the Agreement on Subsidies).  The WTO Agreement
further includes nernotification-  information  and 'positive comity" obliSations relating to
RBps of service supplGrs (Article IX of the GATS) and control of anticompetitire practices
in contractual  licenses  pertaining to intellectual propelry rights (Article 40 of the TRIPS
. Agreement).  Moreover, Article 9 of the Agreemrcnt on Trade-Related lnvestrnent Measures,
erticte 6 of the Agreement  on Preshipment lnspection,  Articles IX and XV of the GATS, and
Articles 8:2 and 4O of the TRIPS Agrecment  call for the funre examination of the
competition  policy aspects of specified trade provisions.  The existing competition rules in the
WTO legal system, the progresiive liberalization of governmental market access barriers, and
the US pofi.V of extraterriiorial  application of US antitrust laws to anticompetitive  conduct
in foreign markets even as soon iJ US exports are harmed, are likely 
-to 
give rise to more
WTO iitput settlement proceedings over trade-retated RBPs and to prompt future
negotiations on additional  competition rules in various fields of WTO law'
3.2
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justiff the DSU rule that pnvate parties have no starding before dispute settlement panels and
itrat onty WTO members can initiate dispute settlement  procedures- But in this as well as in
other respects, the PACT diqpute settlenent  systemcould  .lP deviate from the general WTO
dispute settlement system tt.g. Uy allowing naUonal competition  authorities to initiate PACT
dispute settlement proceedings). 
rt
WTO dispute settlement panels are required to 'make an objective  assessment of the mafter
before it, including an objective asse.ssment of the faAs of O" case and the applicability of
and conformity with the rllevant covered agreements, Tl ttk- t such other findings as will
assist the DSB in rrting the recommendai-ons or in giving the rulings provided for in the
covered agreements'leiticle ll of.the DSU). Panels have comprehensive rights to seek
information  and technical advice from any individual, governmental body or expert group (cf-
Article l3). The .-no"oti.fitv of inforrnation anO of panel deliberations  is protected (cf'
Articles 13 and l4).
Would compliance with PACT obligations  be more difficult to esablish than in other WTO
dispute setdement proceedings  because, fuEtilia, it may depend 
-on 
th-e gathering of
information abroad on.alleged RBPs, .on the protection of private confidentid  information,
and on special expertise fuicompetition  law and cconomic analyses (e-g. definition of the
relevant market and entry barrien)? There might, indeed, be a need for specific remedies
both at the internationat anO at the national level. Yet, it must not be overlooked  that WTO
disputes e.g. over antidumping determinations, financial serrrices commitments  and
intellectual propefly righs may Jso be of a highly fact-intensive  nature and may raise iszues
similar to competition policy iszues.
a) A highly fact-intensive nature is typical also of many GATT and IVTO disputes e.g' in
ttre frerc- of antiOurpiogcnO *nterveiling  duty law, subsidies, state trading enterprises, tax
discrimination, import tcensing practices Jr intettectuA  property tiglttt. In dispute settlement
proceedings over compli-.. iin international competition rules, just as in GATT dispute
settlement-proceeAingio"er  antidumping measures oi abuses of inte[ectual property rights,
two kinds of facs w6uH have to be lsaUtished: those relating to private  busine-ss  practices,
and those relating to the application of international  competition  rules by nationd authorities'
Future WTO diqputes - 'i.g. over private preshipnent  inspection  activities,  adoption  and
.ppti..tion  of standards by non-governmental  stanOarOi"ing bodies, monpolies and exclusive
service zuppliers, or intellectual property rights and licensing coniracts - will increasingly
involve 6".t  rights and privaoinfonnation protected as business secreb. If the parties to
the dispute do noizubmit iufficient evidence, i WfO panel could either have to apply rules
on burden of proof or exercise the panel's right to seek information and technical advice from
any individtnl, body or expert group. g;t Oe panel, unlike many qational.competition
auihorities, would not have the means of compelling  information directly from pivate persons
Appendix I to the DSU states, inrcr alia: "The applicabitity of this
UnberstanOing  to the Plurilateral Trade Agreements  th"ll be subject to tlte
adoption of a?ecison by the parties to eacb agreement  se$ing out the terms for
nt'tppfi.ttion  of the UnOersianOing to ttrc individual agreement' including any
qpoi.l or additional rules or procedures  for inclusion in Appendix 2, as
notified to the DSB."29
or member countries; it could do this only indirectly by requiring the competiti-o^nauthorities
of the parties to the dispute to use ttreir fiA-frnding  and investigatory  powers. If the existing
WTO rules on seeking of information and protection of confidentiality should prove
inadequate, a pACT Jhould provide for all additional  mles and requirements  that are
necessary (e.g. an obligation io establish national competition authorities  with powers to
compel information from enterprises  under investigation)'
b) Infc,rmation, notification and 'lnsitive comity' rpquirqIpnts already exist in the GATS
and TRIpS egror"nt -d r"  actionable under Oi pSU. Pnovisions on information-
gathering  abroad are also included in the Antidumping and Subsidy Agreements'  A PACT
iould provide for any additional obligations, procedurcs 
-and 
sanctions that are considered
no"rr.ry. The e.xisting arrangements for the sharing of confidential inforrnation  among
enforcerient agalies u:f Oifftrint countries,  e.g. in the EC-USA  Agreernent regarding the
apptication of 6eir.orprtition  laws or in tne RJIO of tax law and securities regulation,  could
serve as models.
c) Special legal and economic expertise will be necessary for dealing with^"PACT
oirpu  with most olher disputes e.g. on TRIPS and on
specific cnrs obligations.  It couH be ensured.notably  by appoinring competition  experts as
plnel member,  .oO ar PACT Comminee  members,  by exercising the right of panels to seek
technical advice from "expert groups" and by.esauiistring a "competition  policy division"
within the WTO Secretariat.
d) r ,gal standards of proof and of review will have to differ depending on whether  per-se-
pronffionary  rules-of-reason or 'positive comity" obligations  are at
iirput . But WTO iaw alreaOy in todo differing shndards of review by panels' e'g'
reiarding the estabtishment of the facts Uy glOyryT-g_"ltrotiles and regarding their
inirtpr.titions f antiJurping  law (cf. Article 17.6 of the'WTO Antidumping Agreement)'  In
a simitar way, a PACT iould prescribe specific standards of review.
e) lrgal remedies  under CATT law have in most cases been limited to the determination
oi vioialons of GATT rules and a "ruling" requiring the withdrawal of illegal measures fI
Bunc. Compensatory  concessions or countenneasures  are rarely uttd- a19' if so' only as
temporary measures'pending  the withdrawal of illegal measures. Since 1985, 5 panel reports
have also ,..orn1.nird "tfr.iR. remedies' and, in 4 disputes, led to rulings requiring the
reimbursement of illegatly ievied antidumping  or countervailing duties'
The need for "specific remedies" might also arise in dispute  se&lement proceedings  over
intellectual property rights and other-private rights. The PlcT contracting  parties would
remain free to provide-for  specific remedies too at the national level (e.g' administrative,
civil and criminal sanctions against certain hard core cartel offences, injunctions to 
-daer 
anti-
competitive conoucl, unoettrtings and divestiture)  as well as at the international  level (e-g'
diqpute settlement .ting, that- specific domestic injundions and sanstions be used,
authorization of countermeasures when dispute settlement  nrlings are not 
^implemented,
including the possibiiity of eitratenitorial  appticatioq  of the co-mpetition laws of the adversely
affected country). fne WfO would also inable "cross-retaliation" (e.g. trade remedies if
competition remedies are not implemented)'3.3
About 90% ofthe more than 250 diqpute settlement proceedings  under GATT A'rticle xxIII
related to "violation'.otprtino" (Article XXIII:I,a) that foreigp soye-rnmenlal measures
violate specific Cnff-rifitrtt Tq $_t!4tions- 
The remaining  l0% of these disputes'were
'non-violation complaints" (Article XXIII: I ,b) that foreign governmenal  measures (including
government support iot nnbtl, although not io violatioi olspecific  GATT rules' "nullified
or impaired" n. .oJp"titi"e't*otntJwhich  could reasonably have boen expected under
reciprocal 'GATT toit"ttio*"  (see above section 2,b)' Th; rare 'sitntion complainS"
(Article XXIII:I,c) ";;;;fu 
to a panel report or dispute sefilement mling basd on Article
XXIII:l,c of GATT.
The compeotion rules urd information, notification and cooperation  requirements  of the
PACT would Ue "actionaUle" and enforceable by means-of "violation complaints".' "Non-
violation complaints"  might be useful in order to cover unfore.seen cases e.g. of "nullificatiorr
or impairment" of ;ki.  access commitmenS  by RBPs that are not specifically forbidden
by the PACT. "situation  complaints", which have never been successfully us'ed in GATT
practice,  should *, U" pt""ided f9r in liew 
of their undefined criteria and vague functions
., - tt 
"pa 
clause in cases of "cbanged  circumstances''
There could also be a need for clarifying the impact of the^ PACT on the interpretation and
application of otherWTO agreementstf- intt ot", non-enforcementof  the competitionntles
of a PACT coun afso;u#ry "noo-tiolation complaints" y{"t Article XXm of GATT or
Articte xxlu of GATS if the competitive-conoitioos,  which corrld be reasonably expected
under GATT concessions or undei GATS market access commitments, are "nullified or
impaired" through private rnarket access barriers prohibited under the PACT'"
As in the case of the TRIPS Agreement, for insunce, .the-effectiveness 
ol' international
competition nrles will primarily depend  9n-their 
incorporation  into domestic  competition  laws
and on their enforc.lo"nil,fi'*it adminisrative,  civil and/or criminal proce&tres by
independent Co*rrti. .onorities,.fovate  action and cogrS' A PACT should therefore specify
minimum standards for national investigations, remedies and enforcement measures and
should guafantee private access to domestic 
"otpairioo 
audrorites and courts' cooperation
among competi$on  authorities  from severat countries, based on intcnrational information'
notification  and "positive comity" obligations, would offer a second level of enforcement
activities. Only if such national anA inrcrnational  enforcement measures by private plaintiffs'
competition  authorities and courts. worrld remain ineffective' could the PACT dispute
settlement procedures be invoked as i tnirO level of enforcement neasures' The PACT should
regulate the relationships between tlese Oree levels of enforcemcnt mea$nes  and decide' for
instance, whether access to the international  PACT dispute seltlement procedure should be
made subject to prior exhaustion  of local remedies ano or "positive  comity" procedures'  The
PACT could also prescribe private rights to petition national investigations,  and to initiate the
l9 See on this aspect my discussion  paper No.2, section 2 (f) (dd)'3r
bilateral  cooperation procedures  among competition authorities and the multilateral PACT
dispute settlement procedures  against foreign RBPs.32
Enforcement and dispute setllement
in the GATT and the WTOP
I-  Introduction
This paper highlights the characteristi-9q of the GATT's dispurc setlement sy$em and its
evolution to the "UnOrrst nOiot" on diqpute setrlement which is part of the Firul Act of the
Uruguay Round anO a **.ttt6nt of the new World Trade Organisation'
The GATT has, since the entry into force of the world Trade organisation  on I January
1995, been integrated into thi broader framework of the WTO' Its dispute sefflement
provisions  therefore remain applicable today. They are now, however' part of a wider set
of rules covering, next to tt dt in goods, .fto tfaOt in serrtices and the trade-related aspects
of intellectual property tignS. fnJWtO's Undsstandiog  on dispute sefilement overarches
these three fields-
il.EnforcementoflawanddisputescttlementintheGATTsystcm.
II.1. Historical evolution.
GATT'sdisputesettlementsystem,asitwasnegotiatodafterthesecondworldwar'
is originat and specific and has no equivalent il,fuer fietds of international  relations'
.  The main oUiJtitrs of the mechanisni arc : I. to pfotcct the rigbs of contracting
parties, Z. 
'io-ptotoi. 
Oe secgrity and predictabilig. of the system and 3' where
nece.ssary, to restore the balance oi advanages negotiated in GAfi Rounds'
Procedures are strictly inter-governmental  and private firms (or non-governmental
organisationi  or inOiviOgal$ do not have access io te dispute sefilement system' In
keepingwithrlti*ppt*.h remediesare  also inter-governmental,  althougb ioq"gTt
of anti-dumping "ii 
.o*,"t"tifing  Outy measres-domestic remedies do affect the
exports of siecinc firms. ln the tiUer context the GATT systcm, while recognizing
that dumpin!-and  zubsidization can cause injury to co4eting national firus, does
contain proir" conditions which n""t O 5, nrfnleO  before measufs  can be applied'
Within the Community GATT law and panel nrlings have not had direct effect ''
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GATT members are called contracting parties, in recognition of the fact that the
General Agreement  was primarily of a contractual nature and extrapolated only a
limited number of provisions of the 1947 &aft Havana Charter, which foresaw the
creation of an International Trade Organisation  0TO) on an equal footing with the
Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF and World Bank). The ITO never came to be and
the provisional General Agreement evolved to become the main framework governing
trade relations between its contracting  parties.
When seeking to validate its GATT rights a contracting  party can have recourse to a
wide array of procedures, ranging from bilateral or multilateral constlations to good
offices, conciliation or arbitration, worting parties, Council Decisions  or to panels.
This reflects the basic objecdve of the WStem, which is to reach a mutually
satiSfactory  resolution of conflists rather than the imposition of the rule of law. An
ongoing procedure can be abrogatod at any time if tbe panies to the diqpute have
reached a settlement. Moreover the mechanism cannot in any way, through
interpretation  or othenvise,  create new obligations for conmcting  parties or replace
the negotiating process.
Despite the above the emphasis on negotiated  sefilements  hasnot prevented the GATT
from evolving towards  a rule-oriented  system strengthened by de facto legally binding
interpretations 2. This trend can be expected  to continue under the WTO.
11.2. luticles XKIJ and XXIJI of the General Agreement
The core of GATT dispute settlement procedures tue set out in Articles XXII and
XXru of the General Agreement and have zubsequently  been elaborated,  in reaction
to concrete needs and constraints, by the codification  of evolved practices in legal
instnrmens adopted in 1958, 1966, 1979, 1982 and 1989 3. A number of the so-
called Tokyo Round Agreements have their own particular dispute settlement
procedures.
Dispute settlement  under the GATT is characterised by a sequential approach which
usually starts with bilateral consultations' and can terminate with a panel ruling and,
possibly, a further authorization by the Council for the imposition of countermeasures
(to restore the balance of advantages).  The sliding scale embodied  in the GATT for
the resolution of conflicts is equaly sequential starting with I.  agreement  of the
parties at any point during proceedings  through consultation and negotiation; 2 after
determination by a panel of a violation of GATT rules, a request to bring the
2 Unl-. xt  o. C+c tult  16r b E?a rb o.bir  dr !rd.  sc tdr.
3 no. kl  ldc.tc  c  cqicd  b t*TN.GllGmG  13 il/l/nd t.
{  Prb ohb  re u rqoiqt b ric *  d oqb6  r&  Are mf  : t (c) r i' |l. ttla&a trtt b ir td  a. tt$cr.7l
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by the General Agreement but also by measures  consistent  with it. Nonetheless,  the
nbn-violation pronisions  have been subject to a large measure of debate, insofar as
they could create obligations  for parties without their having breached any norm. In
thii respect the EC has tended to support a restrictive interpretation.
The non-violation  provisiors have most often been invoked in sinrations where a
negotiated and bound Ariff reduction is subsequently nullified by the gnnting of
domestic subsidies by the importing country on the same prductst GATT panels
have specified that, for a case to have any clance of zuccess,  the actions which have
harmed the trade of a party 'cannot have been reSsonably  expected" at the time of
negotiation of a concession. It is firrther to be noted tbat in non-violation cases the
buiden of proof is overturned: it is up to the complainant party tolrovide  "deailed
justification' of the nullification or impainnent of its GATT benefits. Finally non-
violation qases, as they do not require the breach of a provision, do not lead to a legal
obligation to bring one's practices into conformity with the Creneral Agreement.
Action is geared t6wards providing compensation,  again to preserve or restore the
'  balance of advantages.
The third possibility of nullification  or impairrrent is the ambiguous "existence of any
other measure" of Article )OilU : I (c).' No mlings have yet been.based  on this
provision. It has been conceived for "sihration  complaints', as an escape clause in
cases of changed circumstances  (somewhat  like the general legat conce,pt of "clausula
rebus sic stanibus"), but it is unclear to what extent there are at present predictable
and justiciable standards of review for zuch ciNes'
II.4. Panel Rulings.
Viewed from a competition angle a cenhal element of the many panel rulings is that
the basic provisions of the General Agreement  are interpreted as establishing
conditions of competition.  BenefiS accnting under the GAfi as a rezult of
negotiated Uritr reiuctions therefore protect expectations on competitive  conditions
rather than expecations on the volume of trade flows 6. Otherwise put, the concept
of "nullification and impairment of benefits" relates not to trade damage (i.e. actual
access), but to lunexpecteO)  ch4nges in access opprtunities. By its very nature this
well-acce,pted  iotetpietatioo  will further lead the GATT system to a more juridical
framework t.
It is a moot point to what extent adopted panel rulingt llan. stare decists or precedent
effect other than for the relevant paties concerning their particular dispute. Although
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there is no formal stare decisis effect in panel proceedings, earlier nrlings are
regularly tefetteO to in the submissions  of parties as well as in panel reports'
n.5. Weaknesses  of GATT's diqrute settlement system'
By the time of the launching of the Urugruy Round negotiations, the weaknesses of
the panel proceedings  had becomeincreasinlty  apryrcnt-  These related especidly to
l. blockages Alj  jo the general alsence oiuinoing deadlines and automaticity  of
procedurat'phases, (with respect to the formation of a panel, iS terms of reference'
the implemrotation'of  its results Ac.), 2. the lack of an effective mechanism to
calculate Or *qp.osion of concessio*, 3. the lack of a rmiEry system as a result
of the many dispute settlement provisibns engendered in the Tokyo Rolnd codes'
which led to ;iilrr-inopging" 6.e. use of the most convenient procedures by the
complainant p"t y, oo ouioll-**ment possibtg ty-fu respective  parc? and, most
imporantly, Z-'tip po6ce of adoption if p.*f nrfngs by coqsensus  of the GATT
Council as a result of which the tosing parqcotrld alwiys block acce'ptance' and 5'
as a result of iJ, n. inability of Oe-Glff system to ieact adequately  to unilateral
measures (i.e. Ui section lOi tegistation), which were at least in part perceived to
be taken due to the inherent weaLnesses of the:multilateral dispurc settlement  system'
As will be elaborated  below, the new agreement  on dispute setlement embodied in
the Final Act is arguably the most impoiunt qualitative change affecting the GATT
system after the Uruguay Round'
m.DisputesettlementintheWorldTradeOrganisaton.
ilI.1. General.
TheUruguayRoundFinalActforesesthezuccessionoftheprovisional.GATTtoa
fully-fledged world Trade organisation with a pennanent scatus and instinrtional
framework.  The main tasks of ne wro are to iacilitate tbe implementation  of its
annexed Agreements,  to provide a fonrm for negotiations and to administer the
dispute settfm.ot ryrt r,^ Relations between  its udnters will still be strictly inter-
governmental and tie Organisation  will have no autonomous prerogatives to ensure
Ihe compliance by its Members of is provisions'
one of the Annexes to the Agreement establishing the wTQ 1s 
the 
-ney
"Understanding  on rules and pro.&*.r governing the settlement of disputes"' It
resolves *ort r:ttft problems inumerated  inder II.5 above and in mnny ways reflects
the culminatio" orcirTs e.iolution  from aprocess  primarily of a concilia-to-ry  nature
,  calling for negoti4ted'sefilements and compromise  towards a more judicid oriented
system.
The WTO will see a new Dispute Setlement Body (DSB) established,  which will take
over functions previousty e*lrcifu by the GATT Council, i.e. the esAblishment  of
panels and the adoption of panel r.e#, the surveillance of implementation rf ntlings
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lll.2. Procedtrres  become  atrtomatic.
The dispute settlement system has further been strengthened by strict procedures,
6eadlines and a measure of automaticity.  Thus, if conzultations fail to settle a dispute
within 60 days, a panel will be esaUtistreO as a matter of course. Its terms of
reference witi be sanOatO (examination  of compatibility with WTO prwisions),
unless agedotherwise.  If the composition of its Members cannot be s€ftled within
Z0 Oayslttre Director General will nominate them (uzually three).him$f' Wgrking
procedures are specified and there are deadlines for the zubmission of reports (as a
rule within six months, never surpassing nine months). The adoption of a report is
,.  then followed up by tot""iqyct of the implementation of its recommendations'
'  Should implementati-on be lackiirg,  compensatibn or the zuspelsion of concessioqs  will
be authorized as temporary measures. bbjetion to the level of conTsltoqs  proposed
for suspension leads'to UinOing artifation within 60 days. All in all Orc total lenglh
of a procedure  until a panel report is adopted will not take longer than twelve months,
unless a Member decides to appeal (see below).
III.3.
The real qualitative leap embodied in the new provisions it F, a panel report will
be adopted automaticaily unless the DSB should decide otherwise by consensus'
Recognizing the impli..tiont of this requirement which is going to be exfemely
Oiffic-ult to hrffill, negotiators in the Unrguay Round also strengthened the quality and
predictability of'the"system by providing-for an aqpeat procedure- A Standing
nppellate ebdy, comprising oi petsons of recognised authority, YtJl -hot 
appeals
ftom panel caies and iszue judgements on questions of law within 60 days'
Again, an Appellate  Body report must be accepted unconditionally by the parties to
the dispute unless the DSB rejects it by consensus'
The WTO dispute settlement system is "integrated": it overarches all the different
Agreements ,ni,i.n are part of the WTO system (including the new fields of Services
and Intellectual Property) ind services them all t. This will foster a uniform and
coherent interpretation of nrles. Mor@ver a Member may be eltitled , zubject to the
resp€ct of certain criteria, to suspend concessions related to other Agfeemelts  than
that which a defendant parry has 6een found to violate. For example, retaliation can
be taken in the Sewicei sector for a failure to enforce intellecnral  proper$ laws'
ItI.5. Other elements of the new dispute settlement  system'
The.Undersanding explicitly forecloses unilateral action regarding issues covered by
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the WTO e. A number of the WTO Agreemelts  contain specific and taikrr-made
dispute settlement rutes anO proceCures'lt.  -fn"y will prevail over the rules and
procedures  of the generic Unierstanding in those cases where a difference  exists'
The Final Act also brings into the scope of panel pnoceedings certain trade measures
for which specific intergovernmentaf-  foryzuch as Working Farties previously Pp^ll*
by exclusion. Thi; ii ttre case for tfre Caff cotpitilitity of .regional 
rrade
|f,.ffiff-d;;.  restrictive trade meast'es taken to proiect the Balance of
Payments Position-
Further, as was the case in the GATT, there are special disryte settlement  rights for
developing counries, su"t, ., tt,, Pirity. 
to n""' '** 
to tn" Good offices of the
Director-Generaf  . f15 main eft'ect is to inort o the p€riod forthe s'bmission of panel
recommendations  from six months to si*ty d.yr, ,rl*  the panelliss strould consider
this time-frame  too short.
Finally, from a competition  angle it is of relevance  to note that the Final Act imposes
a positive "enforceient  obliga'tion'  upon its Members' In the field of Intellectual
hoperty, Members .r" .oirritt d to actively comtauing wilful tsademark
counter?eiting and copyright piracy "'
In conclusion, GATT,s dispute settlement system r,T. *.n a remarkable exolution
over the last decades.  The uruguay Round understanding  is a cornerstone  of the new
. WTO. fne automaticity  of its-pr;edur;i and ttre quatt-ty 9f is nrlings will provide
a grurantee that the prwisions of the fil.f n"t 
"'Uf ti fully implemented by all
Members.
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